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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN SCHOOLS: AN AMBIGUOUS
PRECEDENT AND THE ROLE OF GENDER IN DETERMINING
REASONABLENESS
MARIA M. LEWIS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Safford Unified School District
#1 v. Redding, a case involving a strip search of a thirteen year old student
whom school district personnel suspected to be in possession of ibuprofen.1
The Court found that the search violated the student's right to be free from
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.2 During oral
arguments, Justice Breyer stated, "I'm trying to work out why this is a
major thing to, say, strip search down to your underclothes, which children
do when they change for gym . . . How bad is this?"3 When later
questioned regarding Justice Breyer's comments, Justice Ginsburg
responded, "Maybe a 13-year-old boy in a locker room doesn't have that
same feeling about his body.4 But a girl who's just at the age where she is
developing, whether she has developed a lot ... or ... has not developed at
all (might be) embarrassed about that."5
These remarks suggest that, at least from Justice Ginsburg's
perspective, a similar search of a thirteen year old boy would be more
reasonable because boys are socially conditioned to feel uninhibited when
exposing their naked bodies in front of others. Are boys less deserving of
constitutional protection because they are expected to feel more
comfortable with their bodies than their female peers? Would the outcome
of the Safford case have been different if Redding had been a male student?
To answer either question in the affirmative undermines the legal system's
longstanding commitment to equal protection under the law. The level of
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368-69 (2009).
2 Id. at 379.
3 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 5,
2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05_05-
ruthginsburg _N.htm.4 Id.
5 Id.
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legal protection afforded to children should not hinge upon broad
generalizations or stereotypes. Nevertheless, a holistic examination of the
Safford case reveals that gender or sex6 may play a covert yet significant
role in the Court's assessment of a student's expectation of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment.
The foundational case for the implementation of the Fourth
Amendment in an educational context is New Jersey v. TL. 0, which set the
standard for what constitutes a reasonable search.7 This article will explore
the application of the TL. 0 standard, with particular emphasis on Safford v.
Redding. Similar to prior case law, Safford reinforces the Court's
commitment to protecting students from unreasonable searches.8 However,
an in-depth exploration of the Safford case demonstrates that the vague
framework set up by the Court in TL. 0 increases courts' susceptibility to
rendering decisions based on socially constructed norms in determining the
reach of the Fourth Amendment.9 Although the Supreme Court appears to
have followed the standard set forth in TL.O. and provided a legally sound
argument for deciding in favor of Redding, this article seeks to reveal the
underlying reasons that may have motivated the Justices to reach such a
conclusion. The Court reached the correct result but it may have been for
reasons that would lead to the opposite result for a similarly situated male
student. Furthermore, the court's failure to explain all components of the
TL.O. standard, particularly the element that relates to a student's sex,
further muddled an already ambiguous standard and heighted the risk that
lower courts will misapply the standard.
Consequently, the purpose of this article is two-fold: to encourage a
closer look at the court's reasoning in Safford in order to expose the
potential for decision-making grounded in stereotypes and to call for
clarification in the TL.0 standard in order to prevent its misapplication.
Part II will provide an introduction to the concept of equal protection and
its corresponding jurisprudence. This section will serve as a background for
understanding the Court's historical stance on judicial decision-making
based upon stereotypes or biases. Part III of this article will explore the
history of the Fourth Amendment and its application in a school setting.
This part of the article will end with an analysis of the TL.O. standard,
paying particular attention to ambiguities surrounding the use of sex as a
criterion in determining the reasonableness of a search. Part IV will discuss
6 Although "sex" typically refers to biological differences and "gender" refers to
socially constructed norms, this article uses both terms because the two terms
overlap for present purposes.
7 See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985).
8 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009).
9 See Id, d.; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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the circumstances surrounding the search of Savanna Redding and the
documents relied on by the Court to make its decision. This part will
provide an argument for a ruling in favor of Redding, without regard for her
sex or gender. Part V will explore lower court decisions in order to further
illustrate the lack of clarity in the T.L.O. standard, which was further
muddled by Safford. This section will conclude with a call for explicit
clarification in the TL.O. standard in order to prevent misapplication, either
explicitly or covertly, by lower courts and the Supreme Court alike.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' In accordance with this mandate, the Supreme
Court has found many sex-based and gender-based distinctions
unconstitutional. 1 An overview of relevant case law will demonstrate the
Court's disapproval of baseless, differential treatment.' Furthermore, this
summary will provide some perspective on why distinctions based on sex
or gender, in the context of cases such as Safford, undermine the purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause.
In 1971, the Court decided Reed v. Reed, a case in which the
Supreme Court was asked to analyze the constitutionality of an Idaho law
that favored men over women in the appointment of an administrator for a
deceased child's estate. 13 The State claimed that the decision to structure
the law in this manner stemmed from a desire to minimize the workload
associated with resolving conflicts over intestacy disputes. 4 While the
Court found some validity in this justification, it was not persuaded that
such an explanation complies with the Equal Protection Clause. 5 The Court
determined that the Idaho law constitutes the "very kind of arbitrary
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (Virginia Military
Institute's exclusion of female cadets violated the Equal Protection Clause.);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1976) (A law that permitted the sale of
beer to men under twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen violated the
Equal Protection Clause.); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1976)
(Gender based distinctions in eligibility for Social Security violated the
Constitution.); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (A mandatory
preference for a male to be an estate administrator over a female violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
12 This overview is intended to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.
13 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 71-73 (1971).
14 Id. at 76.
15 1d.
2015
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legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values
of avoiding intra-family controversy, the choice in this context may not
lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."' 6 Consequently, the
Court's landmark decision in Reed demonstrates that distinctions on the
basis of sex require sufficient justification in order to be upheld. Although
the Court declined to apply a more rigorous standard in its analysis, the
decision marks an important shift in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
Five years later, in Craig v. Boren, males aged eighteen to twenty
challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of beer to men
under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18." 7 The Court found that
"classification by gender must serve important governmental interest and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 8 The
Court warned against reliance on stereotypes and statistics as a justification
behind legislation. 9 As a result, Craig represents the Court's efforts to
protect the public from arbitrary discrimination based societal norms.
In 1996, in United States v. Virginia, the Court once again
addressed differential treatment on the basis of sex.20 In that case, Virginia
Military Institute ("VMI"), a public military institution, excluded women
from admission.2' A woman seeking admission brought suit.22 The court
gave Virginia three options: create an equally competitive institution that
allowed women to attend, admit female students to VMI, or decline public
funding and become a private institution23 Virginia chose the first option
but failed in creating a comparable institution.2 4 Instead, Virginia added a
military curriculum to Mary Baldwin College, an existing, private liberal
arts college. 25 The opportunities and resources available to female students
16 Id. at 76-77.
'7 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92 (1976).
18 Id. at 197.
19 Id. at 208 n. 22 ("If statistics were to govern the permissibility of state alcohol
regulation without regard to the Equal Protection Clause as a limiting principle,
it might follow that States could freely favor Jews and Italian Catholics at the
expense of all other Americans, since available studies regularly demonstrate
that the former two groups exhibit the lowest rates of problem drinking.")
(emphasis added).
20 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
21 Id. at 520-23.
22 Id. at 523.
23 See id. at 525-26.
24 Id. at 553.
25 Id. at 526.
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at Mary Baldwin College differed substantially from those provided at
VMI, which further exacerbated the inequities in the two programs.
26
In order to survive the claim, Virginia had to provide an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for its exclusionary policy.27
Furthermore, the justification "must not rely on overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and
females., 28 This heightened level of scrutiny provides greater protection
from discrimination than the lower standard of rational basis that was
applied in Reed.29
From the preceding analysis, it is evident that the Supreme Court
has established an explicit commitment to protecting against discrimination
based on stereotypes or biases. Consequently, if the Court were to engage in
gender-based or sex-based reasoning in the context of Fourth Amendment
case law, it would contradict its commitment to preserving Equal Protection
under the law. The following analysis will illustrate how and why the Court
faces such a risk.
III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRIOR TO SAFFORD
A. The Fourth Amendment Generally
Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have a right "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."3 Although the Fourth
Amendment applies uniquely in an educational setting, case law in the
criminal context provides a legal foundation for understanding Fourth
Amendment cases involving students.31  In general, Fourth Amendment
case law seeks to strike a balance between individuals' constitutional rights
and public safety.
In the criminal context, the controlling standard is presented in
Terry v. Ohio.32 Under Terry, the primary consideration is whether the
26 See id. at 534, 552-53.
27 Id. at 532-33.
28 Id. at 553 (supporting the court's longstanding commitment to striking down
laws based on generalizations about men and women.); see, e.g., Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
29 Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) with United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (discussing rational basis review).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
32 See, id. In Terry, the officer observed two men acting suspiciously and it
appeared as though the men were planning to rob a store. Id. at 6. After asking
2015
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search is reasonable under the circumstances.3 3 The search must be based
on "specific and articulable facts."34 The exclusionary rule, a rule used in
criminal proceedings, prevents the use of evidence acquired under
circumstances that present a violation of a person's Fourth Amendment
rights.35 In the interest of safety, however, an officer should be able to act
with a sense of immediacy.36 The Terry Court acknowledged that searches
that were justified at their inception may "violate the Fourth Amendment by
virtue of their intolerable intensity and scope."37 According to the Court:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck
in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a
narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.38
B. The Authority of School District Personnel
In a school environment, the standard is adjusted to meet the
complex and unique needs of academic settings.3 9 In an educational
context, the doctrine of in loco parentis, which gives school officials
authority over students while they are in school, has a long history.4" In
1837, a state court described the doctrine as follows:
One of the most sacred duty of parents, is to train up and
qualify their children, for becoming useful and virtuous
members of society; this duty cannot be effectually
performed without the ability to command obedience, to
control stubbornness, to quicken diligence and to reform
bad habits.. .The teacher is the substitute of the parent; and
the men for their names, the officer patted them and felt what appeared to be a
gun. Id. In the interest of safety, the officer took the men into the store, where he
gained possession of the gun. Id.
33 Id. at 9.34 Id. at 21.
11 See id. at 12-15.
36 See id. at 21-23, 28.
3 7 1d. at 18.
38Id. at 27.
3 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
40 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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in the exercise of these delegated duties, is invested with
his power.4
Acting in the place of parents, historically, school officials were
assumed to have broad authority to maintain control over the safety of
schools.42 The doctrine applied unconditionally, even when the school
officials' actions would otherwise constitute a violation of the student's
constitutional rights.43
More recently, however, courts have recognized the need for a
balance between a student's constitutional protections and deference to
school officials.4 4 As the Court famously noted in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District, "It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate., 45 Although Tinker dealt primarily with the First
Amendment, the case demonstrates a shift in the Court's perspective on
school district authority. The presumption is no longer markedly in favor of
school officials, as it was in the past, and this shift in perspective is
apparent in Fourth Amendment cases in schools. 46
C. T.L.O.
Similar to Tinker, TL.O. represents a restriction on the doctrine of
in loco parentis. TL.O. is the foundational case for search and seizure in
schools.47 In TL. 0., a female high school student was found smoking in the
bathroom.48 After questioning the student, the vice principal searched her
purse.49 Through this initial search, he discovered a pack of cigarettes.5"
Such a finding gave rise to a more thorough search of the purse, revealing
marijuana, a large quantity of money, as well as a list of people who
41 Id. at 413-414 (quoting State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365-66 (1837)).
42 See Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273, 274 (Me. 1886).
41 See id.
41 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(discussing First Amendment Constitutional protections for students).
45 Id. at 506. In Tinker, the Court found that in order to justify an intrusion of a
student's First Amendment Rights, the conduct has to "materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school." Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,
749 (5th Cir. 1966)).46 See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y 1977).
47 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336, 347-48 (1985).48 Id. at 328.
49 Id.
50 Id.
2015
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allegedly owed this student money.5 1 The Supreme Court found that the
search was reasonable in light of circumstances. 2 Because the student was
found smoking in the bathroom, it was reasonable to conduct a basic search
of her belongings. 3 Consequently, the search of the purse was not
excessively intrusive.54 Through its analysis, the Court established a
standard for assessing the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment searches in
a school setting.55
i. The T.L.O. Standard
According to the reasoning set forth in TL.O., a search must be
justified at its inception.56 "A search of a student by a teacher or other
school official is 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or [is] violating either the law or rules of the school."57 The
search also has to be permissible in scope: the level of intrusion must be
"reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction."58
It is reasonable to assume that the original intent behind the "age
and sex" portion of the standard was to avoid highly intrusive searches of
young individuals and to avoid inappropriate searches conducted by school
officials of the opposite sex. However, the majority opinion failed to
explain the standard in detail.59 Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, noted that the standard was "obviously designed to prohibit physically
intrusive searches of students by persons of the opposite sex for relatively
minor offenses."6 Following this line of reasoning, it appears that the sex
of the student is less important under circumstances where the level of
intrusion is low. However, there is an alternative interpretation of the "sex"
factor, an interpretation that seems to be at odds with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 The Court's failure to explain and
explicitly analyze all elements of the standard in TL.O. leaves the standard
51 Id.
52 Id. at 347.
53 Id. at 329.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See generally Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
57 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-41.
58 Id. at 342.
51 See generally T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
60 Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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susceptible to erroneous application. Consequently, the interpretation that
supports the differential treatment of female students and male students
deserves additional examination. Such an exploration will involve analysis
of court decisions following TL.O.
D. Vernonia v. Acton
Due to the unique circumstances that individual schools face, drug
policies may differ significantly. For this reason, some school districts such
as Redding's create zero tolerance policies in an effort to curb drug use.62
Other schools implement policies that require drug tests for certain groups
of students.63 For instance, in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, a school
crafted a policy that required student athletes to submit to urinalysis in
order to participate.64 In its decision, the Court based its analysis on the
expectation of privacy of this particular group of students.65 The opinion
noted that students have a lessened expectation of privacy than nonstudents
and that student athletes' expectation of privacy is even less than non-
athletes.66 In the Court's words, "school sports are not for the bashful. 67
Changing clothes in a locker room is commonplace. 68  The Court held that
level of intrusion was reasonable considering the drug use that the school
sought to prevent.69
E. Board of Education v. Earls
Finding similarities between athletes and students participating in
competitive extracurricular activities, in Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, the Court
found that students participating in extracurricular activities could also be
subjected to a urinalysis.7" The Court determined that the policy in Earls
was deemed constitutional "because the policy reasonably serve[d] the
school district's important interest in protecting and preventing drug use
among its students."7 Earls serves as an extension of Vernonia in that it
upheld a school's policy of subjecting students who participate in
extracurricular activities to urinalysis tests. The Court described both
62 See Safford, 557 U.S. at 401.
63 See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
64 1d. at 650.
61 Id. at 657.
66 Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348) (Powell, J. concurring).
67 1d. at 657.
68 Id.
69 Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
70 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002).
711 d. at 825.
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policies as a "negligible intrusion."72 In both of these cases, the interest of
protecting student body from drug use outweighed the minimal intrusion
experienced by these students.73
Although the cases presented in this section demonstrate that the
Court is concerned about characteristics that may affect a student's
expectation of privacy, none of the cases, including TL.O., explain the
portion of the TL. 0 standard that concerns the sex of student. To treat a
student differently based on involvement on extracurricular activities or
athletics is legally distinct from treating students differently based on their
sex or gender. To determine, either explicitly or implicitly, that a student
has a heightened or lessened expectation of privacy based on his or her sex
or gender, contravenes precedent, and more importantly, the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection. An in-depth exploration of the Safford case
will illustrate the vulnerabilities inherent in the unexplained TL.O.
standard.
IV. SAFFORD V. REDDING
Safford is the most recent Supreme Court case involving student
searches. Specifically, the case concerned a middle school student who was
subjected to a strip search in order to comply with a school's zero tolerance
policy. This section will describe and analyze the facts of the Safford case
utilizing the standard set forth in T.L.O. Through an application of the
TL.O. standard, including additional considerations as presented in
Vernonia and Earls, it will become evident that the search of Redding was
unreasonable and would have been unreasonable for a similar set of facts
involving a male student. Following this analysis, this section will provide a
more holistic examination of the Safford case, including an inspection of
the briefs submitted to the Court. Finally, this section will end with an
analysis of the Supreme Court opinion. This section will reveal factors that
may have played a role in the Justice's decision- making process, but may
not be evident in the opinion, itself.
A. General Facts
At the time of the search that is the focal point of the Safford case,
Savana Redding was a thirteen-year-old honors student at Safford Middle
School. 4 In the past, the school experienced a few instances of alcohol and
72 Id. at 833 (citing Vemonia, 515 U.S. at 658).
73 See Earls, 536 U.S. 822; see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646.
7' Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008).
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drugs on campus, none of which could be linked to Redding.7" A week
before the search, a classmate of Redding became sick from consuming
pills that were supplied by another student.76 Even this particular incident
failed to link Redding to drug use.7 7 On the day of the search, the same
student came forward with additional pills as well as information regarding
their origin." Once again, the information failed to implicate Redding.79
The student claimed that the pills came from a student named Marissa, a
friend of Redding.8" Marissa's teacher searched her binder, where he found
more evidence of violations of school district policies.8 Marissa claimed
that the contents of the binder belonged to Redding. This unconfirmed link
led to the strip search of Redding. 2
Unlike other cases where the court has found the search to be
reasonable, Redding's search followed a series of increasingly intrusive,
futile searches.83 Although Redding admitted ownership of the binder, she
denied ownership of the pills contained inside.84 The assistant principal and
the administrative assistant searched Redding's belongings, including her
backpack.85 After finding no evidence to support Marissa's claim, Redding
was taken to the nurse's office, where the nurse searched her jacket, socks
and shoes.86 Following these searches, Redding was asked to move her bra
and underwear aside so that the nurse could be sure that she was not
concealing drugs in either location.87
Redding's sex and gender aside, there is a valid legal basis for
limiting a school district's authority to conduct such invasive searches when
less invasive searches have produced no evidence supporting the need for a
heightened level of intrusiveness. According to Redding's testimony, the
search was severely traumatizing. Furthermore, the facts of Savana's case
can easily be distinguished from TL.O. In T.L.O., a teacher found the
student smoking in the bathroom.88 There was certainly a reasonable
expectation that a quick search of the purse was likely to reveal the
75 Id. at 1075.76 Id. at 1076.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id at 1075.
84 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 369.
87 Id.
88 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
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evidence sought. Additionally, the vice principal in T.L.O. only conducted a
more intrusive search of the student's purse after the initial examination of
the purse proved to be fruitful.89 Redding, on the other hand, denied
possession of the ibuprofen and the initial searches returned no evidence to
contradict her assertions.9" Nonetheless, the school relied solely on the
word of another middle school student to justify a highly intrusive search of
Redding.9 The reasonable expectation that pills would be discovered after a
more thorough search was not present in Redding's case. Based on these
facts, the search was unreasonable and such a determination is extraneous
to her identity as a female student. However, a closer examination at the
case as a whole reveals that Savana's sex and gender may have been a
persuasive factor for the parties and the Supreme Court Justices.
B. Briefs Submitted to the Supreme Court
Briefs submitted to the Court can have a profound effect on the
Justices' understanding of a case. Furthermore, the Justices' personal
experiences undoubtedly influence their perspectives. An in-depth
examination of the briefs submitted on behalf of both parties will reveal
some of the influential factors that may not be apparent in the text of the
decision itself.
When attempting to shed light on institutional biases, it is necessary
to look for clues imbedded in the context of the case in its entirety. The
respondent's brief used the word "girl" twenty-one times. 92 For example,
"forcing a teenager to strip in front of school officials and to bare her naked
body to them seriously violates a young girl's dignity and privacy." 93
Another portion of the brief stated that "the strip search of Savana
traumatized this adolescent girl."94 In contrast to the brief from the
opposing party, these excerpts reveal a conscious effort on the part of
respondents to associate Redding's age and sex with an innocence that
somehow differs from male students.
In comparison, the petitioner's brief only mentioned the word "girl"
thirteen times. However, every time the brief uses the word "girl," it was in
reference to prior case law or to provide technical descriptions of facts,
89 Id.
90 Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008).
91 Id. at 1077.
92 Brief of Respondent, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, No. 08-479 (U.S.
Mar. 25, 2009).
9 Brief of Respondent at 25, Safford, No. 08-479.
94 Brief of Respondent at 12, Safford, No. 08-479.
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such as "girl's bathroom."95 The only nontechnical use of the word "girl"
involved a direct comparison between male and female students.
Specifically, the petitioners contended that drug trends for girls are higher
than for boys, thereby raising the level of suspicion.96 However, it is
important to note that this argument pertains to suspicion, not the
reasonableness of the scope of the search.
Together, these findings indicate that both parties understood that
Redding's identity as a girl had the potential to evoke a sense of sympathy
on the part of the Justices. One party sought to avoid use of the word, while
the other party hoped to use the word to its advantage. Repeatedly drawing
attention to Redding's sex or gender encouraged the Justices to utilize a
gendered, paternalistic lens through which to view the case, even if the use
of such a lens occurred subconsciously. Although petitioner's avoidance of
Redding's identity as a female student, alone, is not sufficient to signify
differential treatment based on sex or gender, a comparison between the
two briefs' use of the term is certainly noteworthy.
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
Using TL.O. as precedent, the Supreme Court held that the strip
search violated Redding's Fourth Amendment rights, but the individuals
responsible for the search were protected by qualified immunity. 97 The
majority opinion was written by Justice Souter while Justice Roberts,
Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer joined.98 Justice Stevens and
Justices Ginsburg concurred on the Fourth Amendment claim but departed
from their colleagues on the issue of qualified immunity.9 9 Justice Thomas
concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the Court's decision
regarding qualified immunity but standing apart from the majority on
whether or not search was a violation of Redding's Fourth Amendment
rights.'0 0
i. Fourth Amendment Claim
Through its analysis, the Court reasoned that, although the search
may have been justified at its inception, the fact that the search became
9 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners at 4, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, No.
08-479 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2009).
96 Brief of Petitioners at 40, Safford, No. 08-479.
Safford, 557 U.S. at 379.
98 Id. at 367
99 Id.
100Id.
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increasingly intrusive was not justified based on the facts presented.' 0 ' The
Court stated:
The very fact of Savana's pulling her underwear away from
her body in the presence of the two officials who were able
to see her necessarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to
some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societal
expectations of personal privacy support the treatment of
such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct
elements of justification on the part of school authorities
for going beyond a search of outer clothing and
belongings.'0 2
The Assistant Vice Principal had no reason to believe that the
situation called for such an invasion of Redding's privacy.0 3 The threat to
school safety was minimal considering the fact that school officials were
aware that the pills were ibuprofen.' °4 Additionally, even if Redding gave
the pills to Marissa, nothing in the record indicated that Redding was
concealing pills in her underwear.'0 5 The Assistant Vice Principal never
even asked Marissa when Redding gave her the pills, which means that
Redding may not have even been carrying pills that day at all, even if she
had given them to Marissa106 The Court's analysis regarding the
seriousness of strip searches of students appears to be gender neutral." °
Citing amicus briefs, the Court stressed that "adolescent vulnerability
intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure."' 0 8 Rather than drawing
attention to the fact that Savana Redding was a female student, the Court
addressed the impact on "young people" generally.'0 9 This analysis speaks
to the "age" factor but fails to account for the "sex" factor of the T.L.O.
standard. By not analyzing the full TL.O. standard in detail, the Court
missed an opportunity to clarify the standard, an exercise that may have led
the Justices to analyze their own biases with greater scrutiny. Did the
Supreme Court intentionally avoid an explanation of how this aspect of
TL.O. applies to the Safford case, or was Justice Stevens correct in TL.O.
when he argued that the "sex" standard was so obviously intended to avoid
10 Id.
102 Id. at 374.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 375-76.
105 Id. at 376
106 
_Id.
107 Id. at 374.
'o' Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009).
'
01 Id. at 374-75.
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unreasonable searches conducted by members of the opposite sex that it is
unnecessary to explain?
ii. Qualified Immunity
Because schools have a genuine concern about and duty to protect
students from violence or drug use, there are compelling policy reasons
supporting the need to shield school officials from liability in circumstances
where their actions coincide with a reasonable interpretation of the law.
Similar to the officer in Terry, school officials need to have some discretion
because they are experts in the climate of their schools. The concept of
qualified immunity protects school officials from liability when their
actions are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the law."'
Qualified immunity allows school officials to act with expediency without
fear that their actions will result in successful litigation against them."'
In the end, the Safford case was remanded for consideration of the
issue of qualified immunity because although the individuals were entitled
to qualified immunity, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether or not
Safford Unified School District can nonetheless be found liable." 2 The
Court based its decision on "the cases viewing school strip searches
differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well-
reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were
sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law."" 3
Although the Court did not explicitly state that its intent was to
provide greater protection to Redding because she is a female, it also did
not explicitly state that Redding's sex or gender did not play a role in its
decision-making. This lack of explication, combined with the ambiguous
standard set forth in T.L.O., heightens the risk of misinterpretation and
misapplication by lower courts. Furthermore, explicit clarification of the
standard has the added benefit of encouraging the Justices to reconsider any
biases that may be motivating their decision-making. These concerns are
further validated by the party briefs and Justice Breyer and Justice
Ginsburg's comments.
V. LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF SEX
Similar to the Supreme Court decisions described in preceding
sections, lower courts fail to thoroughly analyze the "sex" criterion of the
"10 Id. at 377.
111 See generally id.
112 Id. at 379.
"13 Id. at 378-79.
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scope portion of the TL.O. standard. This section will explore relevant
cases in order to further emphasize the need for clarification of the
standard." 
4
A. A Case Involving a Male Student
In Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, a male student was
enrolled in a program for students with behavioral problems." 5 A teacher's
aide saw him outside the school, which was a violation of school rules.
116
Two teachers noticed that student was "too well endowed" and he had an
"unusual bulge in [his] crotch area.""' 7 Based on these observations and the
fact that the student had a history of drug use, the school strip searched the
student.8 During the process, school district personnel asked for consent
from Cornfield's mother, but she refused." 9 Nevertheless, school officials
conducted the search. 2 ° Cornfield was required to remove his clothing and
they inspected his naked body.' 2' He was permitted to put on gym clothes
while they searched his belongings.'2 2 In describing the standard set forth in
TL.O., the court noted that "[a] nude search of a student by an
administrator or teacher of the opposite sex would obviously violate this
standard."'2 3 However, this passage constitutes the extent to which the court
dedicated its attention to the "sex" portion of the standard. This limited
analysis stands in stark contrast to the level of analysis devoted to the "age"
portion of the standard.'2 4 In fact, the court devoted several paragraphs to
clarifying the role that age must play in assessing the constitutionality of a
search of a student.'2 5 In its analysis, the court stressed the fact that
"4 See, e.g., Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citing the T.L.O. standard for intrusiveness with regard to the age and sex of
the students without explicitly explaining the standard while not using those
factors in its decision); see also Kinslye v. Pike Cnty Joint Vocational Sch. Dist.,
604 F.3d 977 (6th Cir. 2010).
115 Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist., 991 F.2d. 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993).
116 Id.
1 71d.
118Id. at 1319, 1322.
119 Id. at 1319.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1320. Furthermore, the court briefly acknowledged the "sex" factor,
although not explicitly, in its reference to the fact that the search was conducted
by two male employees. Id. at 1323.
124 Id. at 1320-21.
125 Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist., 991 F.2d. 1316, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Cornfield's age was an important consideration in that "the sixteen-year-old
Cornfield was of an age at which children are extremely self-conscious
about their bodies." 
126
B. A Case Involving a Female Student
In Phaneuf v. Fraikin, school officials conducted a preannounced
search of backpacks before a senior class picnic. 127 They found a pack of
cigarettes in the student's purse. 128 Another student told one of the teachers
that Phaneuf stated that she had marijuana and that she was going to hide it
in her pants during the search. 129 In this respect, the evidence relating to the
location of the drugs was much stronger than Marissa's general claim that
Redding gave her the pills. 130 Phaneuf s mother conducted the search
because school officials threatened to involve the police if she failed to do
so.' 3 ' According to the court, "the student tip, the past disciplinary
problems, and the suspicious denial--were insufficient by themselves to
justify the strip search, and only the discovery of the cigarettes pushed the
suspicion level across the required
threshold." 13 2 Applying T.L.O., the court determined that the search was not
"justified at its inception."'33 Consequently, the court never reached the part
of the test related to the scope of the search. 34 The court concluded that
considering the totality of the circumstances, the search was a violation of
Phaneuf s Fourth Amendment rights.'35
Comparing these two cases, it appears as though courts are
allowing their beliefs about the differences between males and females to
dictate outcomes. Phaneuf's past disciplinary problems were not sufficient
to justify a search, but Cornfield's "bulge" in his pants was deemed
sufficient. Regardless of the fact that the "bulge" in Cornfield's pants was
observed by a teacher, that does not change the fact that the concrete
evidence used to support the search was based on the size of a young
person's private parts. Phaneuf's search was conducted by her mother and
nevertheless, she was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. 3 6 It is
26 Id. at 1323.
127 Phaneufv. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 592-93 (2d Cir. 2006).
128 Id. at 593.
129 id.
130 Compare Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 593, with Stafford, 557 U.S. at 373 (2009).
'3' Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 594.
132 Id. at 600.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See generally, Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 594, 601.
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undeniable that there are factual differences between these two cases but
their outcomes and analyses indicate that socially constructed norms are
being reinforced through case law. It is reasonable to hypothesize that if the
Cornfield case had involved a suspicion based on the size of a female
student's breasts, rather than the existence of a "bulge" in Cornfield's pants,
it is more likely that such an observation would be viewed as being
inappropriate. This deduction is troubling from a policy perspective and a
legal standpoint.
Arguably, there are significant differences between these cases and
the facts of Savana Redding's case. For example, in Redding's case, the
nurse was searching for prescription strength ibuprofen while in both
Cornfield and Phaneuf school officials were seeking drugs of a more
threatening nature. Nonetheless, taking the whole context of the law into
consideration, it does not seem to be a coincidence that a case involving a
male student did not reach the same result as those involving female
students.
A tendency to favor women in the law in the context of Fourth
Amendment searches in schools could have the unintended consequence of
placing female students in compromising situations. If it becomes clear that
the courts are more likely to sympathize with a female student who has
been strip searched, it is possible that girls will be asked to conceal the
drugs even when they do not belong to them. A desire to protect the school
from drug use may place students in a dangerous situation that might not
have occurred without demonstrated preferences in case law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The scarcity of cases involving successful litigation by male
students is both an indication of societal views of a male student's
expectation of privacy and the court's willingness to perpetuate these
beliefs. The Court has never fully explained the standard it created in T.L.O.
Furthermore, subsequent litigation has paid little attention to the meaning of
the TLO. standard. The circumstances surrounding Savana Redding's case
only serve to complicate the "sex" component of the analysis.
If given another opportunity to hear a Fourth Amendment case in
the context of schools, the Supreme Court should seize the opportunity to
clarify the meaning of TL.O. This clarification will lead to uniformity in
the law by treating male students and female students equally. The level of
intrusion in Redding's case did not satisfy the two prong test set forth in
T.L.O., not because a thirteen-year-old girl was traumatized when she was
forced to reveal her body at an awkward stage in her development, but
because an unreasonable search of any student is a violation of the
Constitution. The hidden preferential treatment for girls interferes with the
right to privacy as a gender neutral value. Our sons are no less deserving of
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constitutional protection because it is socially acceptable for them to be
more comfortable with their bodies than girls at the age of thirteen. Without
clarification and its accompanying rise in judicial consciousness regarding
embedded biases, male students face a risk that they will receive less
constitutional protection than their female peers.

